Norway As Example: It's Forbidden to Discuss How Political Apologists for Terror-Using Groups Unintentionally Increase Terrorism

Note: This article appeared in the Jerusalem Post in response to recent events. I hope this is the last time I address the issue. If you are going to forward or post a copy please use this one as it has a number of small improvements and is not cut.



It is available in Norwegian at http://wp.me/p1mneq-6a9 Scroll down past the English version. I have not been able to check this translation personally.



Before I begin I want to make five points absolutely clear:



1. I was one of the first people in the world to write condemning the action in Norway as terrorism and as committed by a right-winger. Therefore--and based on my career of 35 years including 30 years working on counterterrorism--it should be clear that I would never endorse the murder of dozens of people. The irony is that a plea to fight terrorism by not granting it rewards was distorted into a pro-terrorist position!



2. A large portion of the Norwegian mass media has repeatedly stated that I endorsed the killings and called the kids at the camp terrorists. This is a lie. False quotes were attributed to my article. To my best knowledge, nobody in Norway tried to establish the truth or report fairly.



3. No Norwegian media--indeed no reporter from anywhere in the world--made any attempt to interview me on this issue and find out what I thought and what I wrote. Imagine, this is the biggest story in Norway and nobody contacted me at all.



4. The Jerusalem Post never discussed this issue with me nor contacted me to discuss the issue and hear my position. I have written for this newspaper for about 30 years without a single controversy arising before.



5. We have arrived at the strange situation in which the Norwegian media and apparently the Norwegian government considers me to be "pro-terrorist" but does not consider Hamas (and a number of other groups one could name) to be "pro-terrorist."



What explains this kind of thing--deliberate lies, deceitful reporting, disinterest in truth, disinterest in fairness? Answer: The conversion of the public debate and media into propaganda exercises in which (ironically, McCarthyist) witchhunts are conducted and those entrusted with the sacred pursuit of truth and accuracy use their positions to spread lies, incitement, and indoctrination.



This has been going on now for some years but there's nothing like experiencing something first-hand to comprehend it well. I now hope to get back to work as an analyst of international affairs and especially of the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Store with Hamas Prime Minister Haniya: Smiles at Hamas, Frown at Israel. Deny Being an Enabler of Terrorism. Norwegian media accuses me--but not Hamas--of supporting terrorism. Haniya on US. assassination of Usama bin Ladin, “Of course we condemn the…killing of a Muslim jihad fighter….We pray for Allah to cover him with His mercy, next to the prophets, the righteous, and the martyrs."

A Case Study from Norway:

It Is Forbidden to Discuss How Political Enablers of Terrorist Groups Unintentionally Encourage Terrorism Without Being Labelled A Terrorist



By Barry Rubin



“I do not understand Norway’s position, and I say that as a friend of Norway. If they shoot, if they fire rockets, why doesn’t Norway believe that they are terrorists? What else do they need to do? Let us not forget that Norway and the other Scandinavian countries called in Yasir Arafat and said: `Iif you want a deal, you must first renounce terrorism. You must recognize the state of Israel, and you must commit yourself to peace.’ Why is all this forgotten? What is the difference between the PLO at that time and Hamas today?” --President Shimon Peres, May 2011



We want Palestine in its entirety—so there will not be any misunderstandings. If our generation is unable to achieve this, the next one will, and we are raising our children on this. Palestine means Palestine in its entirety, and Israel cannot exist in our midst…. We liberated Gaza through resistance. We want to conduct resistance in the West Bank as well." -- Hamas leader Mahmud Zahhar, July 2011, a few days before members of Norway’s ruling party expressed enthusiasm for helping Hamas. .



Ironically, the reaction to my article, “The Oslo Syndrome,” proved its thesis, the same point as the one President Shimon Peres made. If terrorism is empowered, terrorism is more likely to occur. That uncontroversial point has been blown up into something controversial by deceit.



The Norwegian government and media establishment wants no honest discussion of these issues. Instead, my article was misrepresented in order to stir up a frenzy that closed ears and shut eyes to what I was saying. Indeed, the Norwegian newspaper falsely claimed that I had endorsed the terrorist attack there.



How’s that for constructive dialogue and healing?



The blog “Israel Matzav” sums up my position very well:



“Rubin said that this terror attack, committed by a ‘normal Norwegian boy’ [not my words] ought to make Norwegians do some introspection about their government's support for terror organizations like Hamas. Is Norway giving its youth the wrong message through its support for Hamas? Why is Norway not even willing to ask itself that question?”



And the Norwegian reaction is to reiterate--as the ambassador portrayed his country’s view--that there is a rational reason to murder Israeli children (“occupation,” despite the fact that Israel has withdrawn from all of the Gaza Strip, much of the West Bank, and indicated its readiness to accept a Palestinian state eleven years ago) but not to murder Norwegian children. In other words, one can only discuss the evil Norwegian terrorist in the parameters laid down by the Norwegian left. One can talk endlessly about how his specific ideology--right-wing, allegedly Christian, and Islamophobic--but not the way he fits into a much wider pattern of rising terrorism in general.



I didn’t write about the content of his ideology but about his choice of strategy on the basis of my three decades’ of scholarly study about terrorism. Why did the Norwegian terrorist think that killing people would help—not hurt—his cause? Because like terrorists around the world he sees other groups that use terrorism succeed politically, build a mass base of support, and gain sympathy for their cause despite their methods.



Second, nobody else apologizes for criticizing Israel in the harshest terms after terrorist attacks, something I did not do to Norway. No newspaper in the world to my knowledge apologized for the terrible things written on its pages about the United States after September 11.



The deputy foreign minister and foreign minister of Norway, who both attacked me, have never criticized Hamas or Hizballah by name. Last May, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre explained, “We condemn organizations that are involved in terrorism, but Norway has considered the situation as such that having lists where we put an organization and call it a terrorist organization will not serve our purposes.”



Obviously, if Hamas was named as a terrorist group then cabinet ministers can’t have its leaders to tea. But by not naming it, they are saying: You can commit hundreds of acts of terror and it will cost you nothing politically. But if Israel responds, for example, by counterattacking into the Gaza Strip, we will condemn Israel.



Yes, this is a policy that encourages terrorism and makes it look successful: it wins sympathy for the cause and antagonism toward the victims. But while Norway won’t criticize terrorist groups by name, its officials and media are unrestrained in attacking Israel.



Alan Dershowitz has written from personal observation that in Norway, “Anti-Semitism doesn't even mask itself as anti-Zionism.” And this behavior is carried on by public institutions and media.



Former Prime Minister Kare Willoch criticized President Barack Obama for appointing Rahm Emanuel as his chief of staff because he was “Jewish.” Nor the author Jostein Gaarder who wrote an op-ed in Aftenposten entitled, “God’s Chosen People” at a time when three Israeli soldiers had been kidnapped by Hizballah and a war was on, describing Judaism as “an archaic national and warlike religion.” Apology?



In 2008, a Norwegian comedian said on national television, “I would like to wish all Norwegian Jews a Merry Christmas - no, what am I saying! You don't celebrate Christmas, do you!? It was you who crucified Jesus." Apology? Last year the minister of finance spoke at a largely Islamist-organized anti-Israel rally. Apology? A person who has served as a Foreign Ministry official remarked in 2008 that she occasionally wished the UN would send “precision-guided missiles against selected Israeli targets.” Apology?



But I never said and I’m not saying now that a terrorist attack took place in Norway because of its anti-Israel policies or atmosphere. Nor am I saying that Norway “supports” terrorism itself, that it applauds the murder of civilians elsewhere. What I’m saying--as nobody has publicly acknowledged in Norway—is that to show terrorists they will get more sympathy than Israel, to reward a group like Hamas, to say that terrorism can be ignored if directed against the “proper” people is to increase the overall level of terrorism against Israel and in the world, including in Norway itself.



You’ve never heard of Samira Munir and Norway’s establishment has swept her story away. She was a Norwegian politician of Pakistani origin who fought for women’s rights and against sharia law. She was found dead in November 2004, supposedly a suicide but seeming far more likely to have been a terrorist murder. She had received daily death threats by phone and walking down the street. Might this act, whose perpetrators were never punished, indicate that some people think they can commit terrorism, get away with it, and suffer no political damage?



If others who have extremist views and/or mental disorders see every day that terrorism produces political advantage and sympathy for those who commit it they are more likely to commit terrorism. If groups see their terrorism is no barrier to being invited to Norway and to have lunch with cabinet ministers while their enemies’ self-defense countermeasures will be condemned and vilified they are more likely to adopt terrorism as a strategy.



The underlying concept of the Norwegian response is that Norway is a country that isn’t supposed to have terrorism committed against it. But Israel is a country that deserves to have terrorism committed against it. My point is that neither country “deserves” to have this happen. That doesn’t mean Norway is guilty or should be punished or that an evil terrorist attack is justified. No, it means that Norway should be more consistently and universally against giving terrorists victories—even though it does so by ignoring their terrorism.



We are now approaching the tenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the United States. There were those then, including in Norway, who said the United States had it coming and the attack was due to its policies. There are always those—including in Norway—who say that Israel has it coming and the attack is due to its policies.



My view is the precise opposite. I’m saying about Norway precisely the same thing I said about the United States after September 11: the attack proves the need to take a tougher stance against terrorism and against all terrorist groups. If the world thinks al-Qaida won and its attack brought political gains, then there would be more terrorism. As it happened, there was tough action against al-Qaida itself but other terrorist groups concluded that terrorism worked, increased their operations, and did reap political rewards.



The Norwegian government and left-wing media wants there to be two sectors in the world: those immune not only from criticism but from serious discussion of their actions, as compared with those who can be lied about with impunity, have hatred incited against them, and then must apologize for not staying in their place as second-class people with second-class rights to express their views.



What I wrote in the “Oslo Syndrome” is that people who accept rationales for terrorism and reward those movements politically increase terrorism. Equally, those who accept double standards, slanderous lies (without apology) about themselves in the media of other countries, and the consorting of those countries with groups that want to exterminate them only increase that behavior, too.



Here are some good responses to the situation:



http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2011/08/norways-deputy-foreign-minister-appeals.html



A collection of antisemitic cartoons in the Norwegian media:

http://www.israelwhat.com/anti-semtic-cartoons-in-the-mainstream-media/



Alan Dershowitz article (free registration required)

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704474804576222561887244764.html



A long analysis of Norway’s actions

http://daphneanson.blogspot.com/2011/07/sad-song-of-norway-its-antisemitic.html



Peres and Store quotes: http://www.newsinenglish.no/2011/05/06/peres-criticizes-norway-on-hamas/

Zahhar quote, http://www.memri.org/clip_transcript/en/3051.htm



Haniya quote http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/2910.htm



A fascinating story about a Norwegian-Arab politician from Syria who has renounced her former antisemitism and become a critic of Norway's policy from that perspective.

http://blogs.jpost.com/content/more-tolerance-norway

Reading Ahmadinejad in Riga

This article is published on PajamasMedia. The full text is printed here for your convenience.


By Barry Rubin

There’s nothing like having to explain a complex subject to people to improve one’s own understanding of the issues. And when you must tailor the briefing for a specific cultural and historical background, this new angle is also conducive to learning more. Whenever I have to give a talk I learn something new.

So here are a few things that having to explain the Middle East to a group of serious intellectuals, officials, and diplomats in Riga, Latvia, made me understand.

First, in trying to have a good one-sentence explanation about the events of the last couple of months, I hit on this idea:

The question is whether these revolutions are more like that of 1917 or of 1991.

Everyone understood what that meant. In 1917 there was a revolution against a dictatorial government, that of the czar of Russia. The revolutionaries were full of enthusiasm and idealism; many thought the movement would bring real democracy. Instead it brought 70 years of Communist oppression, even worse for many than the previous regime.

The irony is made even more intense by the fact that Riga was the industrial center of Russia, full of workers and hence of a disproportionately high number of Bolsheviks. The Lithuanian rifle regiments were among the most militant and reliable of Red Army forces, also furnishing many cadres who would be the foundation of the Soviet secret police. So while Latvia suffered horribly under Communist rule, a number of Latvians were involved in imposing the new regime.

In contrast, the 1991 revolution was one of liberation from a dictatorship that produced a democratic rebirth. Thus, if the Middle East revolutions turn out like the1917 upheaval it means things will be worse, while if they lead to the result of the 1991 uprising, then those Arab societies will be on the road to something much better.

While I stress that every country is different and go into the details of those differences, I’m expecting Tunisia to be more like 1991 and Egypt closer to 1917. Of course, if I was speaking to an Egyptian audience, I’d use the years 1952 and 1979, that is comparing the other Egyptian revolution—which produced a radical nationalist and military regime—with that of Iran, which brought a military regime. If I wanted to be a bit optimistic, I’d mention 1919, a moderate nationalist revolution that helped produce an independent Egypt with a parliamentary system.

Two other useful points came up in a question from an important political figure. He spoke about how his country “returned” to democracy in 1991 and to a national existence interrupted by invasions of both Nazi Germany and the Communist USSR.

The other key concept is the regional, wider picture. From a Latvian (and most European) perspective, this implies the European Union and NATO, in other words having stabilizing and beneficial—let’s not get into the shortcomings of the EU right now—institutions.

I thought this really put the Arab political problems into perspective. For in the Arabic-speaking world, what is there to return to? Most obviously, that means the Islamist interpretation of an ideal traditional society that in practice would mean a totalitarian nightmare. In Egypt, it could also mean, alternatively, a return to militant nationalism. After all, Egypt is almost certain to elect as president Amr Moussa, the country’s most famous living Nasserist.

So while a “return” to the past in Central Europe was good, in the Middle East it can be disastrous.

As to the other point, in the Middle East regionalization means the attempts of different countries to subvert each other, as Arab politics traditionally functioned. Few outside observers realize that more energy was spent between the 1930s and 1970s or 1980s on Arab states trying to take each other over or battle among themselves than was devoted to destroying Israel. In addition, the Arab-Israeli conflict could reignite for the first time since the1970s. The conflict's decline had clearly began when Egypt made a peace treaty with Israel; the conflict's revival could begin with a new Egypt that no longer feels bound by that treaty.

Several factors make it easier for Central Europeans to understand the Middle East than it is for Western Europeans. They understand that ideology matters, having lived under an ideological dictatorship. That is a concept that many in the farther west find impossible to understand. They also know, living under Russia’s looming shadow that threats still exist in the world.

When you've had the likes of Hitler and Stalin knocking down your door and trampling you underfoot, you're less likely to think that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a harmless clown.

And with all necessary allowances for the differences, I tell them to think about the revolutionary Islamists as being like Communists. They get the parallels: disciplined, revolutionary, ideological, ambitious, willing to conceal their aims, pretending to be moderate at times, setting up front groups, using useful idiots, being patient and keeping the long-term perspective in mind, but unlikely to change their ultimate aims, and many more techniques from the repertoire of Communism can also be seen in Islamism.

I also point out that in Central Europe, the transition from Communism to democracy was eased by the fact that the "dissidents" had religion and nationalism on their side. The churches opposed Communism and supported moderation and democracy; nationalism united the people against the foreign rulers, that is the Russians.

Here, though, I miscalculate a bit in my wording. A distinguished leading figure objects to my use of the word "nationalism." For him, that word implies something hardline and right-wing. It isn't that he's against patriotism that's the problem--as it would someone in a North American or Western European audience--it's that he takes it for granted. You don't need nationalist slogans when the whole nation is united already in wanting to reestablish their own state.

To make this point, I respond: If the USSR had become fully democratic would you have wanted to remain under Moscow's rule? Of course not. But today nationalism in the Arabic-speaking world retains a very ferocious and potentially aggressive breed of nationalism. Here is one area where differences make things a bit misleading and a careful explanation must be made.

Finally, as a small country, ultimately dependent for its security on Western Europe and most of all America, they comprehend how the lack of strength and leadership in those quarters jeopardizes their most fundamental interests. There is now a club of countries around the world who have common concerns in this regard.

In Asia, there are those who fear China and there is India concerned about Pakistan. In the Middle East there are a large set of countries—Morocco, Algeria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the small Gulf states among them—that want Western protection from revolutionary Islamism and Iran. In South America, they have parallel situations of countries really worried about Venezuela and some other ambitious regimes. And there are those in Central Europe and the Caucasus who feel that Russia has not settled down to be a peaceful and benevolent neighbor.

Finally, there are the democratic oppositions in Islamist oriented or radical nationalist states—Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, and Syria—that desperately want Western support and just aren’t getting any.

These dozens of countries don’t complain about America being a unilateral bully, they bemoan its lack of self-confidence and strength. If it fails, their very survival is on the line.

So it’s easier to explain all of these things to Central Europeans, who still remember the lessons of history, than it would be in London or Paris where, many seem to think that the personification of modern evil is George W. Bush and the biggest contemporary international threat often appears to be Israel.

At any rate, nobody is surprised or upset at the idea that events might not turn out so well or assumes that democracy is inevitable and that radicals can be transformed into moderates by sympathy. They know things can go wrong and that the world is a dangerous place.

Some Wisdom on How to Deal With An Economic Crisis

This article was published on PajamasMedia. If you wish to reprint it please link to PajamasMedia. The text is provided here for your convenience.

By Barry Rubin

I'm in Riga, Latvia today, where my grandfather was born and my great-grandparents lived. It is a charming city and I hope to write more about it later. But I wanted to share with you a little story that you might find relevant.

Whether or not you know it, Latvia has gone through one of the most difficult economic situations of any European country, though things are a bit better now. A major bank failure forced a massive increase in government spending and the national debt last year.

One of my conversations was with a Latvian intellectual involved in public affairs. As we discussed the problem I asked what Latvia's government and leadership did about the crisis. Without hesitation he answered:

"What do you do when your economy goes into a crisis like this? It's obvious! You must sharply cut the government's budget of course and that's what we did."

Sounds pretty obvious, doesn't it?